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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HOW PORTABLE IS LEVEL-0 BEHAVIOR? A TEST OF LEVEL-k
THEORY IN GAMES WITH NON-NEUTRAL FRAMES
BY SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP, DAVID ROJO ARJONA,
AND ROBERT SUGDEN1
We test the portability of level-0 assumptions in level-k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek
games with common, non-neutral frames. Assuming that level-0 behavior depends only
on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about
salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level-k models to Hide and Seek data. We show
that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that
replicates the main patterns in these data has a high probability of false positives.
KEYWORDS: Level-k theory, Hide and Seek, coordination, discoordination.

1. INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY, GAME THEORY ANALYZES the interaction of ideally rational agents whose rationality is common knowledge. Recently, however, there
has been growing interest in investigating how in fact human agents reason
in strategic situations. In such work, the most widely used approach is that of
level-k theory (Stahl and Wilson (1994), Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford,
and Broseta (2001)) and the closely related cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer,
Ho, and Chong (2004)). These theories distinguish types of players according
to the level at which they reason. Assumptions about level-0 (L0) behavior provide an anchor for beliefs and behavior at higher levels. At each higher level,
players are assumed to know the probability distributions of choices at lower
levels. L1 players choose best replies to L0 choices; L2 players choose best
replies to L1 choices (or, in cognitive hierarchy theory, to a probability mix of
L0 and L1 choices); and so on.
In some applications, L0 players are assumed to pick strategies at random,
but for many games this parsimonious assumption yields inaccurate predictions. A standard practice in level-k modeling is to tailor the L0 specification
to the particular game being analyzed, subject to the general principle that it
can be interpreted as “a strategically naïve initial assessment of others’ likely
responses to the game” (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013, p. 14)).
This may be a useful first step in theory development, but if level-k theory is
1
We thank Vincent Crawford, Nagore Iriberri, Ariel Rubinstein, participants in many conferences and seminars, an editor, and four anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions
of this paper. Hargreaves Heap’s and Sugden’s work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council through the Network for Integrated Behavioural Science (Grant reference
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to have explanatory power, it must be based on well-defined hypotheses about
L0 behavior that apply across a reasonably wide range of games. Further, to
avoid circularity, there has to be a clear conceptual distinction between the imperfectly rational strategic thinking that the theory is intended to explain and
the kind of thinking that can be attributed to L0 by assumption. The clearest
way to make this distinction is to require, as level-k theorists sometimes do,
that L0 behavior responds only to non-strategic features of games.2 The level-k
research program rests on implicit confidence that such hypotheses can be developed, and that they will generate successful predictions. But in the absence
of concrete proposed hypotheses, how can one assess whether that confidence
is justified? This is the question we address.
Existing tests of level-k theory are not particularly helpful for that assessment. Many such tests have used an ex post model-fitting approach. That approach works by specifying a parametric level-k model of behavior in a particular game and by fitting that model to (usually experimental) data. The L0
specification is often specific to the game, and justified by appeals to intuition;
sometimes (e.g., Crawford and Iriberri (2007), Penczynski (2013)) it is partly
determined in the process of model-fitting. Level-k theory is then judged in
terms of the model’s goodness-of-fit, as compared with that of parametric models derived from alternative theories (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri
(2013) reviewed many such exercises). Other studies, such as the analyses of
coordinated attack games by Strzalecki (2010) and Kneeland (2012), have derived empirically confirmed qualitative implications from level-k models. In
these models, too, assumptions about L0 behavior are justified by their intuitive plausibility as representations of naïve play in the relevant games. These
ways of testing level-k theory, therefore, have a common limitation. At most,
they can show that in each of a variety of games considered separately, players’
behavior is consistent with some plausible assumption about L0 behavior.3
In this paper, we use a different method to investigate the portability across
games of assumptions about non-strategic L0 behavior. The essential idea is to
use simple two-player games in which, after abstracting from properties of labeling, the pure strategies for each player (considered separately) are isomorphic with one another. Strategies are distinguished only by their labels, which
differ in ways that can be expected to be salient to naïve players. The “frame”
2
For example, Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008, p. 1450) explained an L0 specification for coordination games by saying “Bearing in mind that L0 is only the starting point for
players’ strategic thinking, we define it via nonstrategic, behaviorally plausible general principles.”
3
A complementary research strategy, which does not depend on specific assumptions about
L0, investigates whether players’ reasoning processes have the iterated best response structure
of level-k theory. Experiments that track players’ sequential use of information (Costa-Gomes,
Crawford, and Broseta (2001)), elicit “provisional choices” (Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman
(2012)), and analyze players’ justifications of “suggested decisions” (Penczynski (2013)) have
found supporting evidence. However, a level-k model of iterated reasoning in any particular
game still requires assumptions about L0, and the portability of these assumptions remains an
open question.
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(i.e., the number of strategies and their labels) is the same for both players. It
is natural to assume that, in games of this kind, the behavior of a non-strategic
L0 player depends only on the frame. Any such L0 specification is thus directly
portable across player roles in a given game, and across strategically different
games that have the same frame. Our experiment tests cross-role and crossgame predictions of level-k theory that are conditional on the portability of
the L0 specification. Crucially, we do not need to make any substantive assumptions about that specification itself. Our methodological approach is one
of ex ante hypothesis testing, rather than ex post model-fitting.
Of course, we cannot claim that the portability property we test is implied by
every possible general hypothesis about L0 behavior. But any such hypothesis
must have some well-defined implications about portability across strategically
distinct games and player roles. If L0 specifications were not portable even
within our tightly restricted sets of games, it would seem hard to be optimistic
about finding such a general theory of L0 behavior.
In Section 2, we define the class of games to which our analysis applies, and
state the joint hypothesis that we will test to assess the portability of L0 assumptions. We derive implications of that hypothesis for behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games that share the same frame.
In Section 3, we explain the experimental design we used to test these implications. It is based on that used in a series of experiments conducted by
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and
Rubinstein (1999), which we describe collectively as the work of “RTH.” In
Section 4, we report our results. These provide little support for the joint hypothesis. In Section 5, we consider how our findings can be reconciled with apparently conflicting conclusions drawn under the ex post model-fitting methodology. We focus on Crawford and Iriberri (2007; henceforth “CI”) because they
fitted a level-k model to data from some of RTH’s Hide and Seek games. In
the final section, we discuss the wider implications of our results.
2. THEORY
We investigate behavior in a class of two-player simultaneous-move games,
defined as follows. For each player, there are m alternative pure strategies,
where m ≥ 3.4 There is a set F = {l1      lm } of distinct labels, such that, for
each player, each strategy is uniquely identified by one of these labels; this set
is the frame. We consider three different payoff matrices for such games. In a
Hide and Seek game, if both players’ chosen strategies have the same label, one
player (the hider) gets a payoff of 0 and the other (the seeker) gets 1; otherwise,
the hider gets 1 and the seeker gets 0. In a Coordination game, both players get
4
We do not include the case where m = 2 because, following a common practice in the study
of Hide and Seek, we want to use frames in which one label is perceived as being different from
all the other labels in some particularly salient respect.
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a payoff of 1 if their chosen strategies have the same label and 0 if not. In a
Discoordination game, they both get 1 if their chosen strategies have different
labels and 0 if not.5
For each of the four player roles (coordinator, discoordinator, hider, and
seeker) considered separately, every pure strategy is isomorphic with every
other in terms of payoffs; strategies are distinguished only by their labels. In
such a case, it is natural to assume that L0 behavior is the same for all roles. As
described by level-k theory, strategic reasoning takes a similar form for players
in all roles. (At each level above L0, coordinators and seekers choose the label
that is the most frequent choice of co-players at the level below; discoordinators and hiders choose the label that is the least frequent choice of co-players
at the level below.) As a starting point for analysis, we therefore assume that
play is no more or less sophisticated in any one of these roles than in any other.
In accordance with the preceding arguments, we state three hypotheses
about behavior in any Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek
games that share a common frame F = {l1      lm } and that are played by individuals drawn at random from the same population:
H1. Level-k theory holds.
H2. The probability distribution of choices at L0 over the labels l1      lm is
the same for all four player roles.
H3. The population distribution of players across levels L0, L1,    is the
same for all four player roles.
Our objective is to test the joint hypothesis “H1 and H2 and H3.”6 H2 is the
portability property that is the central concern of this paper. As we explain
later, the predictions we test are not particularly sensitive to H3.
Our experiment investigates odd-one-out frames, constructed so that one label, the oddity (denoted by l1 ), is clearly different from the others. (In one
frame, for example, the four labels are the words “love,” “hate,” “detest,” and
“dislike”; in another, they are “rude,” “polite,” “honest,” and “friendly.”) It is
natural to expect that if L0 choices are not uniformly random, the main deviation from randomness will be that the probability of choosing l1 is particularly
high or particularly low. In principle, the direction of deviation might depend
on the connotations of the oddity relative to the other labels (positive in the
case of “love,” negative in the case of “rude”).7 However, we do not need to
5
How far level-k theory explains behavior in these games is an important question. For example, that theory is one of the main competing approaches to the so far unresolved problem
of explaining focal points in Coordination games (see, e.g., Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994),
Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008), Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (2010)).
6
“Level-k theory” in H1 is to be understood as excluding cognitive hierarchy theory. The predictions we test, and hence our findings about the portability of L0 specifications, are specific
to level-k theory, narrowly defined. The problem of finding portable L0 specifications is just as
acute for cognitive hierarchy theory, but that is not the topic of the current paper.
7
We treat the connotations of a label—that is, the affective qualities of the things to which it
refers—as distinct from the payoffs that result from the choice of that label. The hypothesis that
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make assumptions about the direction of deviation. Given H2, level-k theory
implies that in any Coordination game, all types L1, L2,    choose the label
that is the modal choice at L0. Thus, if, in any given frame, the oddity is the
modal choice of coordinators, we can infer (conditional on the truth of the
joint hypothesis) that the oddity is also the modal choice at L0. That inference
is valid whatever the connotations of the oddity. We will restrict our analysis to
frames with this property.
In constructing frames, we tried to ensure that no non-oddity stood out
in a way that would make it uniquely disfavored at L0. We test whether we
achieved this by investigating the distribution of discoordinators’ choices over
non-oddities. If some non-oddity label, say lm , were chosen at L0 with strictly
lower probability than every other label, it would be the uniquely optimal
choice at L1, L3,    , and choices at L2, L4,    would be distributed over the
other labels. Thus, under any plausible assumption about the distribution of
players across levels, the overall distribution of discoordinators’ choices would
have a spike at lm .8
For any given odd-one-out frame, we will say that L0 choices have an oddone-out distribution if l1 is chosen with some probability q > 1/m, and if each
other lj is chosen with probability (1 − q)/(m − 1). We submit that if the experimental data show that l1 is the modal choice of coordinators (Validation
Condition 1), and if they show no systematic non-randomness in the distribution of discoordinators’ choices over l2      lm (Validation Condition 2), then
in deriving implications of the joint hypothesis, it is reasonable to model L0
choices by an odd-one-out distribution.
We now consider the implications of the joint hypothesis, conditional on
L0 choices having an odd-one-out distribution. Notice this condition is not
an assumption about L0 behavior; it is a property that can be inferred from
satisfaction of the Validation Conditions. We interpret “level-k theory” in H1
as including the assumption (also made by CI) that the relative frequency of
the L0 type is zero. For ease of exposition, we assume that there are no players
at levels higher than L4.9 The relative frequencies of L1, L2, L3, and L4 types
are denoted π1 , π2 , π3 , and π4 , respectively. Assuming (as CI did) that ties
are broken uniformly randomly, the probability with which l1 is predicted to
be chosen by each type in each game is as shown in Table I. The odd-one-out
distribution of L0 choices implies that, in all cases, all non-oddities are chosen
with equal probability.
L0 types favor labels with positive connotations is orthogonal to propositions about the payoff
structure of the game. For a contrasting analysis of payoff-relevant connotations, see CI’s Web
Appendix.
8
For hiders and seekers, the predicted effects of a uniquely disfavored label lm are less sharp.
Overall, hiders and seekers will favor both l1 and lm (because l1 is chosen by L1 seekers and L2
hiders, while lm is chosen by L1 hiders and L4 seekers).
9
This assumption is not strictly necessary. In all the games we analyze L5 types would behave
just like L1 types L6 just like L2, and so on.
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TABLE I

IMPLICATIONS OF LEVEL -k THEORY FOR MATCHED GAMES WITH ODD -ONE-OUT FRAMES
(WITHOUT ERRORS)
Choice Probability for l1 :
Role

L0

L1

L2

L3

L4

All Players

Coordinators
Discoordinators
Hiders
Seekers

q
q
q
q

1
0
0
1

1
1
0
0

1
0
1
0

1
1
1
1

1
π 2 + π4
π 3 + π4
π 1 + π4

Since our objective is to test the joint hypothesis using observations of choice
behavior, we are concerned with implications that do not depend on specific
assumptions about the distribution of players across types. We focus on two
such implications:
Implication 1: Averaging over equal numbers of discoordinators, hiders, and
seekers, the oddity is chosen with a probability of at least 1/3. This follows from
the fact that the average of the entries in the “all players” column of Table I
for discoordinators, hiders, and seekers is 1/3 + 2π4 /3 (where π4 ≥ 0).
Implication 2: For each player role (i.e., coordinator, discoordinator, hider,
seeker), the probability with which the oddity is chosen is independent of the number of strategies and the frame. This follows from the fact that, for each role,
the “all players” probability depends only on the distribution of types in the
population.
These implications are surprising and, as far as we know, specific to level-k
theory. We now consider their robustness to possible relaxations of the joint
hypothesis, compatible with the general spirit of level-k theory. First, an error
structure can be added to the level-k model by assuming that, for each type
L1, L2,    , the probability that it forms the correct belief about the modal
L0 choice is 1 − eF , where 0 ≤ eF < (m − 1)/m;10 otherwise, each of labels
l2      lm is equally likely to be believed to be modal. Table I then describes the
special case in which eF = 0. The general case can be described by replacing
each “1” entry in Table I by 1 − eF , and each “0” entry by eF /(m − 1).11 Thus,
for any given frame F , players’ propensity to error is revealed in the frequency
of non-oddity choices in the relevant Coordination game. If error propensities
are known, Implications 1 and 2 can be revised to take account of error, as we
explain in Section 4.
10

This condition is necessary to ensure that l1 is more likely than any other label to be believed
to be modal.
11
This error structure is equivalent to that assumed by CI, except that our error parameter
is allowed to depend on the frame. CI’s error parameter ε is equivalent to eF m/(m − 1) in our
notation.
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Second, although level-k theorists commonly assume that there are no players at L0 (e.g., Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013)), this practice is
not universal. Relaxing this assumption would have similar effects to those of
introducing an error structure, except that the impact on Implications 1 and 2
would be smaller.12
Third, since H3 is needed only for the derivation of Implication 1, relaxations
of that hypothesis would not affect Implication 2. Further, for each of the roles
of discoordinator, hider, and seeker separately (and therefore independently of
H3), the choice probability of l1 is 1 at two of the four levels L1, L2, L3, and L4.
Thus, Implication 1 is likely to be robust to plausible relaxations of H3. More
specifically, it has been suggested that the decision problem faced by seekers
is cognitively less demanding than that faced by hiders (Rubinstein, Tversky,
and Heller (1996)). One might therefore want to assume, contrary to H3, that
higher-level types are more frequent among seekers (and coordinators) than
among hiders (and discoordinators). But, since the seeker types that choose l1
are L1 (the lowest in the model) and L4 (the highest), Implication 1 is unlikely
to be invalidated by plausible upward shifts in the distribution of seeker types.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiment used Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek
games with common frames. It took place in two series of sessions, using different subjects. As the two sets of subjects were recruited in the same way from
the same pool of potential participants, it is reasonable to treat them as independent samples drawn from a single population.
The HS sessions involved 200 subjects, randomly matched into pairs, which
were maintained throughout. In the first part of each HS session, each pair
played a series of eighteen Hide and Seek games using different frames, with
no feedback until the end of the experiment. One (randomly assigned) member of the pair played all eighteen games as hider, the other as seeker. In the
second part of the session, the players’ roles were reversed; the same eighteen
games were played, in the same order as before, and again without feedback.
After both parts had been completed, one game was selected at random from
each part. For each of these games, the winner was paid £10 and the loser was
paid nothing.
The CD sessions involved 80 subjects, randomly matched into pairs, again
maintained throughout. Each pair played a series of eighteen Coordination
games, followed by or preceded by a series of eighteen Discoordination games
using different frames, the order of the two series being counterbalanced.
12
Our error model is equivalent to assuming an additional type L∗ , with probability π ∗ =
eF m/(m − 1), that chooses among strategies at random, and scaling down each of π1      π4
by the factor 1 − π ∗ . The impact on Implications 1 and 2 would be less if L∗ were assumed to
favor l1 , as L0 does.
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There was no feedback until both parts had been completed. Then, for each
pair, one game was selected at random from each part. For each of these
games, both players were paid £5 if they had achieved the objective of the
game, and nothing otherwise.
Each game was presented to players as a row of either four or eight boxes,
each of which enclosed a word, symbol, or picture. We will refer to these sets
of boxes (without reference to position) as “frames.” Each player knew that
her co-player was seeing the same boxes in the same positions from left to
right, and was asked to choose one box, either (if a coordinator or seeker)
with the aim of choosing the same box as that chosen by her co-player, or (if a
discoordinator or hider) with the aim of choosing a different box. The positions
of the boxes were independently randomized for each pair and for each game.
We used 36 frames, eighteen with four boxes and eighteen with eight boxes.
Each row in Figure 1 shows one of the eighteen frames (1b,    , 18b) used in
eight-box games. For purposes of reference, each box is numbered from left to
right in the figure.
Our intention was that each frame should create an obvious oddity, and that
all the other labels should be equally undistinguished. The oddity is shown in
box 1 in the frames of Figure 1. Following Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller
(1996), we used two different forms of oddity. In each of frames 1b, 4b, 5b, 6b,
8b, and 15b, seven of the boxes are identical; the box with the distinct content is

FIGURE 1.—Frames.
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FIGURE 1.—Continued.

the objective oddity. In each of the other frames, every box is distinct, but box 1
is intended to be perceived as the subjective oddity. Again following Rubinstein
et al., the oddity can have positive, negative, or neutral connotations relative to
the other boxes in its frame. (The oddity is positive in frames 7b, 8b, 9b, 16b,
17b, and 18b, negative in frames 1b, 2b, 3b, 10b, 11b, and 12b, and neutral in
frames 4b, 5b, 6b, 13b, 14b, and 15b.) The main function of this variety of forms
of oddity was to maintain subjects’ interest and attention. For the purposes of
our tests, it is irrelevant what form oddity takes.
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FIGURE 1.—Continued.

To generate as much similarity as possible between games with different values of m, the frames 1a,    , 18a for the four-box games were formed by removing boxes 5, 6, 7, and 8 from each of the frames 1b,    , 18b. Frames 1a,
2a, 4a, 5a, 7a, and 9a are virtually identical with those used in the six games
investigated by Rubinstein et al.
The methods by which games were assigned to pairs of subjects, and by which
the order of games played by pairs was randomized, are described in the Supplemental Material (Hargreaves Heap, Rojo Arjona, and Sugden (2014)). Part
1 of the HS sessions provided 50 observations of hiders and 50 observations
of seekers in each of the 36 frames. We use these data for our main tests of
level-k theory, but for completeness we also report the part 2 data.13 The CD
13
Part 2 of the HS treatment was an add-on investigation of the conjecture that, if a subject
played a series of Hide and Seek games in one role and then exactly the same games in the other
role, her reasoning would be more sophisticated in the second series.
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treatment was designed with the intention of pooling data from parts 1 and 2,
to provide 40 observations of coordinators and 40 observations of discoordinators in each of the 36 frames.
The experiment was conducted at the CBESS Laboratory at the University
of East Anglia. It was implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Subjects
were recruited from the general student population and participated anonymously at computer workstations. Instructions (reproduced in the Supplemental Material) were presented on subjects’ screens and were also read aloud by
an experimenter to ensure that they were common knowledge. Sessions lasted
for approximately 50 minutes. In the CD sessions, average earnings were £7.13;
in the HS sessions, necessarily, they were exactly £10.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Potential Confounds: Order and Position Effects
The order in which blocks of games were played, and the order in which Coordination and Discoordination games were played in the CD sessions, had no
systematic effect on players’ behavior. As we expected, there were systematic
differences between the two parts of the HS sessions.14 We therefore pool CD
data across the two parts of the experiment, but analyze the two parts of the
HS data separately.
Because the positions of the boxes were randomized, we test for systematic position effects by comparing the frequencies with which subjects’ chosen
boxes were in each of the positions 1,    , 4 (in four-box games) or 1,    , 8 (in
eight-box games). The relevant data are summarized in Table II. It is apparent
that, in each class of games and for each role, each position was chosen with
approximately the same frequency. The statistical tests reported in the table
indicate that there may be some position effects in our data, but it seems clear
that position was not a major determinant of players’ choices.15 From now on,
therefore, we abstract from position effects and consider only the content of
the boxes.
4.2. Odd-One-Out Properties
Since Implications 1 and 2 are conditional on L0 choices having an odd-oneout distribution, we check that the Validation Conditions were satisfied.
14
Between part 1 and part 2, the frequency of oddity choices in both four- and eight-box games
increased for hiders and decreased for seekers. Except in the case of eight-box hiders, these
differences were statistically significant. Since part 1 seekers tended to favor oddities while part 1
hiders tended to avoid them, these results suggest some tendency for seekers who had previously
played as hiders to play best responses to their own previous hiding behavior, and vice versa.
15
Further analysis of position effects is reported in the Supplemental Material.
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TABLE II
FREQUENCY OF CHOICES BY POSITIONa
Percentage of Choices That Are of Position:

Role

1

2

3

4

Four-box games
Coordinators (n = 40)
Discoordinators (n = 40)
Hiders (part 1: n = 100)
Hiders (part 2: n = 100)
Seekers (part 1: n = 100)
Seekers (part 2: n = 100)

27.5∗∗
26.4∗∗
25.0
24.3∗∗
22.9
22.2∗∗

24.4
20.3∗∗
22.2
24.6∗
27.7∗
25.9

26.1
26.8
24.9
24.9
28.3
31.2∗∗∗

21.9
26.5
27.9
26.2
21.1∗∗
20.7∗∗∗

Eight-box games
Coordinators (n = 40)
Discoordinators (n = 40)
Hiders (part 1: n = 100)
Hiders (part 2: n = 100)
Seekers (part 1: n = 100)
Seekers (part 2: n = 100)

12.8∗
10.1
12.1
13.7
10.0∗
10.2∗∗∗

14.7
13.5
13.0
14.2
13.4
10.7

10.0
16.0∗∗
13.0
11.7∗∗∗
13.8
15.8∗∗∗

12.1∗∗∗
10.0
10.2
11.1∗∗
13.2
14.0

5

6

7

8

16.9∗∗∗
12.6
9.8∗
10.8∗
13.6
15.4

11.5
12.6
13.3
14.4
12.8
14.4

122
14.9
15.6
12.9
12.3
11.2

9.7∗∗
10.3
13.0
11.2
10.9
8.2∗∗∗

a n denotes the number of subjects who faced games of the relevant type. Each coordinator and discoordinator
faced 18 games of that type; each hider and seeker faced 9 games of that type. Relative frequencies greater than the
random-choice benchmark (25 percent for four-box games, 12.5 percent for eight-box games) are shown in bold. For
each type of game and each position j , we find the number of choices made in position j by each subject i, and then run
a chi-squared test of whether the distribution of these n numbers is different from the binomial distribution implied
by random choice. Significant differences are shown by asterisks (∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denoting significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent levels).

Table III reports the frequency with which, in each frame, the oddity was
chosen by coordinators (and, for completeness, by players in the other roles).
In every frame but one (frame 11a), the oddity was the modal choice of coordinators, satisfying Validation Condition 1. In 33 of the 36 frames, the oddity
was chosen by a majority (often a very large majority) of players, even though
choices were distributed over four or eight labels. Although there was some
tendency for oddities to be chosen less frequently if their connotations were
negative than if they were neutral or positive, it is clear that coordinators’
choices were very strongly skewed toward oddities, irrespective of connotations. Given this regularity, the most natural explanation of the anomalous
behavior in frame 11a is that many subjects failed to perceive l1 (Kabul) as the
oddity.16 We therefore drop this frame from our analysis.
Our test of Validation Condition 2 found no systematic non-randomness in
discoordinators’ choices over non-oddities.17 We conclude that tests of Implications 1 and 2 are valid tests of the joint hypothesis.
16
The three labels most frequently chosen by coordinators in this frame were Venice (17
choices), Kabul (10 choices), and Madagascar (also 10 choices).
17
Since we have abstracted from position effects, this test is relevant only for the 24 games with
subjective oddities. For each of these games, we compare the observed distribution of discoordi-
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TABLE III
FREQUENCY OF ODDITY CHOICES BY FRAMEa
Percentage of Oddity Choices
Four-Box Games

Eight-Box Games

Frame

Connotation

C

D

H1

H2

S1

S2

C

D

H1

H2

S1

S2

1a, b
2a, b
3a, b
4a, b
5a, b
6a, b
7a, b
8a, b
9a, b
10a, b
11a, b
12a, b
13a, b
14a, b
15a, b
16a, b
17a, b
18a, b

Negative
Negative
Negative
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Positive
Positive
Positive

73
70
68
80
80
93
85
93
88
53
25
68
80
68
85
83
90
90

28
28
15
30
23
25
40
28
13
30
33
25
20
13
15
20
18
20

14
14
6
18
14
6
14
12
8
20
22
12
22
16
14
10
22
18

20
12
10
20
24
22
22
12
18
18
30
18
18
12
18
16
16
22

20
24
22
16
28
22
24
20
32
24
24
26
24
16
30
48
30
34

10
6
6
18
22
20
38
22
22
16
22
20
12
24
22
36
18
40

85
58
60
83
95
93
88
88
93
40
28
70
80
63
93
90
80
85

23
13
3
25
25
18
10
20
13
20
13
10
23
13
10
13
10
20

10
10
12
16
8
12
8
12
8
6
12
0
4
2
6
10
6
12

12
10
6
8
10
8
8
8
6
14
16
6
2
2
14
20
10
16

24
24
22
28
38
28
36
28
34
16
16
24
10
6
24
36
34
28

8
12
6
20
24
14
24
32
18
12
8
14
10
6
18
26
16
22

76

23

15

18

26

21

76

15

9

10

25

16

All frames

a C, D, H1, H2, S1, S2 denote coordinators (n = 40), discoordinators (n = 40), part 1 hiders (n = 100), part 2 hiders
(n = 100), part 1 seekers (n = 100), and part 2 seekers (n = 100), respectively.

4.3. Frequency of Oddity Choices
The observed relative frequencies of oddity choices in the four roles are reported (as percentages) in the second column of Table IV. The first and third
columns report the lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals for these relative frequencies, calculated by treating subjects as the units
of observation.
Implication 1 is that, in the absence of error, the expected value of the average of the relative frequencies of oddity choices for discoordinators, hiders,
and seekers (the synthetic average) is at least 0.333. As explained in Section 3,
we use the part 1 HS data in testing Implications 1 and 2 (our main conclusions
would be unchanged if we used part 2 data instead). The observed synthetic avnators’ choices over non-oddities with the distribution implied by uniformly random choice over
non-oddities (given actual choices of oddities). The null hypothesis of random choice is rejected
at the 5 percent level in only one of the 21 cases in which there are enough non-oddity choices to
allow a reliable chi-squared test. This 1/21 rejection rate is almost exactly what one would expect
from randomly generated data.
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TABLE IV
FREQUENCY OF ODDITY CHOICES BY PLAYERS IN ALL ROLESa
Percentage of All Choices That Are of Oddity

Role

Lower Bound

Observed

Upper Bound

Four-box games
Coordinators (n = 40)
Discoordinators (n = 40)
Hiders (part 1: n = 100)
Hiders (part 2: n = 100)
Seekers (part 1: n = 100)
Seekers (part 2: n = 100)

714
171
121
148
235
181

790
228
150
186
275
220

86.6
28.5
17.9
22.5
31.5
25.9

Eight-box games
Coordinators (n = 40)
Discoordinators (n = 40)
Hiders (part 1: n = 100)
Hiders (part 2: n = 100)
Seekers (part 1: n = 100)
Seekers (part 2: n = 100)

696
93
54
68
212
119

760
154
86
98
253
161

82.4
21.5
11.7
12.8
29.5
20.4

a n denotes the number of subjects who faced games of the relevant type. Each coordinator and discoordinator
faced 18 games of that type (of which 17 or 18 appear in the analysis, depending on whether frame 11a was faced).
Each hider and seeker faced 9 games of that type (of which 8 or 9 appear in the analysis).

erage is only 0.218 for four-box games and 0.164 for eight-box games. Even if,
for each of the three roles, we were to use the upper bound of the relevant confidence interval rather than the observed value, the synthetic average would be
only 0.260 for four-box games and 0.209 for eight-box games.
If errors are taken into account, Implication 1 generalizes to the prediction
that the expected value of the synthetic average is at least (1/3)(1 − eF ) +
(2/3)(eF /[m − 1]). The average frequencies of oddity choices by coordinators
imply values of eF of 0.21 and 0.24 in four- and eight-box games, respectively.18
Using these values, the synthetic average is predicted to be at least 0.310 for
four-box games and at least 0.276 for eight-box games—still well outside the
confidence intervals of our observations. We conclude that those observations
are not consistent with Implication 1.
Implication 2 is that, in the absence of error and for any given player role,
the expected proportion of oddity choices is the same for four- and eight-box
games. The observed proportions of oddity choices at the two values of m are
not significantly different for coordinators and seekers, but for discoordinators
and hiders, the four-box proportions are greater than the corresponding eight18
We conjecture that the similarity between these values is the result of two opposing effects
offsetting one another. The more boxes there are to choose from, the more candidates there are
for the status of “most salient box”; but the unique property of an oddity is more obvious, the
more items lacking that property are presented alongside it.
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box proportions by margins of 0.074 and 0.064, respectively. These differences
are significant at the 5 percent level and are too large to be explained by error.19
As a robustness check, we ran the same tests of Implications 1 and 2 using
only the data from games with neutral frames. The results were very similar:
Implication 1 was still rejected, as was Implication 2 for hiders (see Supplemental Material for details).
5. RECONCILING RESULTS OF EX ANTE HYPOTHESIS-TESTING AND EX POST
MODEL-FITTING

Our results give little support to the joint hypothesis, and hence to the idea
that L0 specifications are portable across strategy-isomorphic games with common frames. However, CI showed that a parameterized level-k model has a
good fit on data from six of RTH’s Hide and Seek games. They argued that
this model explains a “robust” and role-asymmetric fatal attraction pattern in
those data: the strategy with the “least salient” label “was the strongly modal
choice for both hiders and seekers, and was even more prevalent for seekers
than hiders” (pp. 1732–1733). Since CI’s model satisfies H2 and H3 with respect to the roles of hiders and seekers, their results provide some evidence of
the portability of L0 assumptions. In this section, we try to resolve the apparent
conflict between CI’s conclusions and ours.
The most important difference between the two analyses is that CI’s is restricted to Hide and Seek games, even though RTH’s experiments included
Coordination and Discoordination games with the same “AABA” and “ABAA”
frames as Hide and Seek games in CI’s data set. In these cases, as in our experiment, RTH found that the oddity was the strongly modal choice of coordinators. The implication (if level-k theory is correct) is that the oddity was the
modal L0 choice of coordinators. In our analysis, but not in CI’s, this implication constrains the L0 specification for hiders and seekers.
CI instead assumed that a label is more likely to be chosen at L0, the more
“salient” it is, with salience defined as follows. In four of the six games they
analyzed,20 each player chose one “item” from a row of four letters—three As
and one B, with the B in second or third place. CI assumed that “central A” is
the least salient item, on the grounds that B is salient as the oddity and that end
19
Using the inferred error parameters, the level-k model implies that discoordinators choose
the oddity with probability 0790(π2 + π4 ) + 0210(π1 + π3 )/3 in four-box games and 0760(π2 +
π4 ) + 0240(π1 + π3 )/7 in eight-box games. The former exceeds the latter by 0030 + 0006(π1 +
π3 ). The corresponding excess for hiders is 0030 + 0006(π1 + π2 ). Both values are in the interval
[0030 0036] for all distributions of player types.
20
CI’s analysis excluded three games from Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996) in which the
frames are essentially the same as our 2a, 7a, and 8a, and the oddity is in second or third position.
These games are similar to ABAA and AABA games, but are excluded because the oddity has
positive or negative connotations (see CI’s Web Appendix). Only one of these games shows the
fatal attraction pattern.
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locations “may be inherently salient,”21 and assumed that the two “end As” are
equally salient. They allowed the data to decide whether B is the most salient
item (Specification 1) or whether the end As are jointly most salient (Specification 2). In the remaining two games, the items are the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4.
Without further explanation, CI assumed that 3 is least salient, that 1 and 4 are
equally salient, and that 2 is most salient if and only if Specification 1 applies
to ABAA and AABA games. Given these assumptions about salience, choices
in all six games show the fatal attraction pattern. But conversely, the claim
that this pattern is a robust feature of the data set depends on this particular
combination of assumptions.22
CI fitted two alternative models to the pooled data from the six games. In
both models, the distribution of player types and the L0 specification are the
same for hiders and seekers, and types other than L1, L2, L3, and L4 have
zero relative frequency. The models differ according to whether Specification
1 or 2 determines L0 behavior. The best-fitting of this class of models has the
somewhat counterintuitive Specification 2. CI presented this as a “convincing”
and “plausible” explanation of RTH’s results (p. 1748) and, in particular, of the
fatal attraction pattern. The implicit claim is that the ability of a model with
plausible level-k assumptions to replicate an apparently surprising pattern in
those data is evidence of the explanatory power of level-k theory.23
Since the L0 specification of this model does not explain behavior in ABAA
and AABA Coordination games, CI’s claim about the explanatory power of
level-k theory can be accepted only if one does not require (as our hypothesis
H2 does) that L0 assumptions are portable from Hide and Seek to Coordination. Conversely, if one views H2 as a natural extension of level-k theory, it
may seem surprising that a model that is inconsistent with that hypothesis can
fit experimental data. But just how surprising is this?
21
The latter claim is supported by an unexplained citation of an experiment by Christenfeld
(1995), which, in fact, found that when individuals pick from a row of identical items, they tend
to avoid the end locations (CI, p. 1732).
22
One might also ask whether our experiment found the fatal attraction pattern in those games
that were most like CI’s AABA and ABAA games, that is, four-box games in which an objective
oddity with neutral connotations appeared in the second or third position. In these games, seekers
tended to favor the central non-oddity (which CI interpreted as “least salient”), but hiders did
not. Summing over part 1 and part 2 HS sessions, there are 185 (non-independent) observations
of such games. The distributions of choices over “end non-oddity,” “oddity,” and “central nonoddity” were (107 30 48) for hiders and (73 51 61) for seekers, compared with the randomchoice expectation (925 4625 4625).
23
Responding to possible doubts about the explanatory power of their estimated model, CI
tested its portability by applying it to experimental data from two other games. However, the
frames of those games are too different from RTH’s Hide and Seek games to allow portability
of the L0 specification. In effect, CI used a new L0 specification for each of the games. CI also
reported that if their model was estimated using data from any one of the six RTH games in their
data set, it had a good fit with the rest of the data. But this merely confirms the similarity of the
data from the six games, when classified according to CI’s assumptions about salience.
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Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the only available data are
those from the six Hide and Seek games analyzed by CI, and that Specifications
1 and 2 are the only plausible representations of L0 behavior. Thus, we have
a data set with the fatal attraction pattern. A level-k model can be configured
to predict that pattern. But for how many other possible patterns can the same
claim be made?
Recall that in both specifications, the end As (or 1 and 4) are chosen with
equal frequency at L0.24 This forces a level-k model to predict that the end As
are chosen with equal frequency by all types. Thus, CI’s model has to explain
the distributions of hiders’ and seekers’ choices between only three categories:
B, central A, and the combination of the two end As. There are only four independent observations to be explained by a model with two alternative specifications, each with three free parameters (describing the population distribution
of types).
The fatal attraction pattern is described by the triple (central A central A
seeker) whose elements are respectively the modal choice of hiders, the modal
choice of seekers, and which of the two roles has the higher mode. Ignoring
ties, there are eighteen such patterns. (Since the model treats “end A” as a
single category, we define its choice frequency as the average of the choice
frequencies of the two end A items.) Following CI’s arguments (p. 1743), we
define a level-k model to be plausible if it has Specification 1 or 2 and has
the properties π2 > π1 and π3 > π4 (i.e., the distribution of levels is “humpshaped”). It can be shown that, of the eighteen possible patterns, seven (i.e.,
39 percent of the total) are predicted by plausible level-k models.25 The implication of this result, we suggest, is that even though CI’s modeling framework
imposes portability of the L0 specification between hiders and seekers, it allows too much freedom for the ex post rationalization of observed behavior.
Thus, CI’s claim that level-k theory explains the fatal attraction pattern (rather
than that the theory can be configured to fit it) is open to question.26
6. CONCLUSION
We have studied a class of frames in which one label is the obvious oddone-out. When those frames are used in Coordination games, the oddity is
24
CI justified this assumption on the model-fitting grounds that “the end A frequencies are
almost equal in the data” (p. 1738). Thus, the model does not explain that observation.
25
The proof of this claim is given in the Supplemental Material.
26
This critique applies with even greater force to Penczynski’s (2013) analysis of behavior in
Hide and Seek games with ABAA frames. Penczynski fitted a level-k model in which both the
distribution of player types and the L0 specification were allowed to differ between hiders and
seekers. This gave many more free parameters than in CI’s analysis, and so even more scope
for ex post rationalization. Since the fatal attraction pattern is an asymmetry between roles, it is
hardly surprising that the best-fitting model has role asymmetries. (In this model, seekers reason
at higher levels than hiders. In one of six cases studied, L0 behavior is significantly different for
the two roles.)
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overwhelmingly the modal choice. Thus, if level-k theory is correct, the oddity must be the modal choice of L0 types in those games. If, for each given
frame, the specification of L0 is assumed to be the same for coordinators, discoordinators, hiders, and seekers, level-k theory implies that when frames with
oddities are used in Discoordination and Hide and Seek games, the choice frequency for the oddity will be disproportionately high. But this hypothesis is
disconfirmed by our data.
This result poses a severe challenge for the project of completing level-k theory by developing general hypotheses about L0 behavior. To be consistent with
our data, L0 behavior must vary according to whether a given frame is confronted by a coordinator, discoordinator, hider, or seeker. But, since each of
the three games is strategy-isomorphic when roles are considered separately, it
is difficult to see how a general theory of L0 behavior can discriminate between
those roles without using strategic properties of the games as explanatory variables; and to do that would be to compromise the aspiration of level-k theorists
to anchor strategic reasoning on assumptions about non-strategic behavior.
Of course, it may still be possible to find a general definition of “naïve” L0
play that allows for some strategic awareness without simply reporting theorists’ intuitions about naïveté in particular games, and that generates accurate predictions. Or perhaps a more fundamental theory of analogical learning
might allow such conceptions of naïveté to vary between players according to
their private experience (compare Jehiel (2005)). But completing level-k theory in these ways will require a lot more work, and there is no guarantee of
success.
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